To Talk or Not to Talk: In US-China Communication Breakdown, Taiwan Question is the “Core of the Core”
China’s lack of interest in military-to-military communication with the US draws on cultural differences and shows China’s obsessive focus on solving the Taiwan issue according to its own interest.
“Communication is key” for all relationships, goes the old saying. This includes relationships between countries; at least the United States thinks so. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken visited China on June 18-19, which was the first visit by a top US official to that country in five years. His visit “emphasized the importance of maintaining open channels of communication across the full range of issues to reduce the risk of miscalculation.” However, his Chinese counterparts appeared uninterested in reviving dialogue, particularly military-to-military communication, anytime soon. Chinese explained this disinterest in terms of principle, saying that the country does not engage in “communication for the sake of communication,” and that communication should build upon “respecting each other and on an equal footing.” (hxxp://www.news[.]cn/2023-06/22/c_1129711459.htm)
Does this sound familiar? Blinken and his Chinese counterparts seemed to resemble a married couple, in which one is begging the other to have a talk, but the other says, “I don’t want to talk to you unless you change your behavior and attitude.” In past years, Chinese officials have compared the US-China relationship to a marriage. In 2013 Vice Premier Wang Yang “describe[d] how the United States and China must cooperate and build trust like a married couple, and respect each other’s right to speak.” In 2015, former ABC Television vice president Harvey Dzodin, in a guest editorial in Chinese state-owned English-language media China Daily, wrote, “On my opinion, China and the US are the very best of frenemies—friends and enemies. But like a married couple in a love-hate relationship in a place that doesn't allow divorce, we have to find common ground.”
If “to talk or not to talk” is the question between the US and China, what to talk or not talk about, and how and why to talk or not talk, are crucial to understanding the question.
Channels of Communication Between the US and Chinese Militaries
Although US Secretary of State Blinken made military communication channels a priority on his China trip, he said he “failed to revive military-to-military talks with China” after “repeatedly” raising the need for direct communication between the two countries’ militaries. China persistently refused to agree to move forward at this moment. The US-China military-to-military dialogue that Blinken mentioned include three main military communication channels that the two countries established over the past 25 years. China cancelled all three on August 5, 2022, in response to US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.
These three main military-to-military communication channels are:
US-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) (中美海上军事安全磋商机制会议)
The MMCA, established in 1998, was the first military agreement between the U.S. and China. It includes an annual conference, plenary sessions and working group meetings. The annual conference attracts participants at the rank of major general or lieutenant general. The MMCA provides a way for the two militaries to communicate and manage differences and risks at sea and in the air. Before 2022, China suspended the MMCA meetings twice, once following the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and again after a collision between a US Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plan and a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy F-8 fighter over the South China Sea in 2001. The most recent MMCA Working Group meeting and Flag Officer annual session took place virtually on December 14-16, 2021.
US-China Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCT) (中美国防部工作会晤)
The DPCT Talks were established in 2006 to address defense policy issues between the two militaries. The DPCT was the most active and important formal channel between two militaries and runs every year. The most recent meeting was the 16th DPCT meeting on September 28 and 29, 2021 which Dr. Michael Chase, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for China, and Major General Huang Xueping, Deputy Director of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Office for International Military Cooperation, co-hosted virtually.
US-China Theater Commanders Talk (中美两军战区领导通话)
The US-China Theater Commanders Talk was established in 2016 after the PLA reorganized its seven military regions to five theater commands, including Eastern, Western, Northern, Southern and Central Command.
Cultural Differences on Communications
It seems China is determined not to communicate with the US military. In addition to canceling the three major military communication channels, China refused to pick up crisis line calls or respond to other engagement requests. In February 2023, China did not answer the call from US defense officials after the US shot down an alleged Chinese spy balloon. In fact, since 2021, China has declined or not responded to more than a dozen requests to talk with US defense officials and nearly 10 working-level engagement requests, a senior US defense official told Reuters. This has caused growing concern for US officials. China has shown “a concerning lack of interest in the important lines of communication that underpin a stable defense relationship between our countries,” Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Jedidiah P. Royal wrote in a statement before the House Armed Service Committee.
According to China’s official line, one reason for China’s refusal of communication is because the “necessary atmosphere and conditions” are lacking. This refers to the fact that the Chinese Minister of Defense Li Shangfu is still under US sanctions. The US sanctioned Li in 2018 while he was head of PLA’s Equipment Development Department and oversaw Chinese purchases of Russian combat aircraft and equipment. The current Chinese official line appears to be that removal of sanctions against Li is a prerequisite – part of the “necessary atmosphere and conditions” – for any military talks with the US.
Chinese commentators allude to cultural values of respect in denouncing the continued sanctions against Li as “humiliating” for a Chinese Minister of Defense. “How could the Chinese defense minister be willing to sit down with US military officials and talk calmly after being ‘humiliated’ by the US sanctions?” an international studies professor from the Chinese Academy of Diplomacy asked in May 2023, adding, “the US is daydreaming!” Defense Minister Li and China would lose face if he accepted requests to talk with US officials. “Losing face” refers to losing the respect of others, and in China the cult of “face” (面子) – a cultural understanding of respect, honor and social standing – is serious. That’s probably why China repeatedly emphasized “mutual respect” as the first step of communication. (hxxp://www.news[.]cn/2023-06/22/c_1129711459.htm)
Another reason they give is the differences in fundamental understandings of communication, as pointed out by Shen Yamei, deputy director and associate research fellow in the department of American studies at Chinese state-backed think tank China Institute of International Studies. Shen told CNBC that China is afraid “the so-called conflict control or crisis control measures that the US has been keen to set up” would encourage the US with “more [reckless] and careless and brazenly bold action.” Shen said the US’s mindset of worst-case scenarios and setting up hotlines and crisis control are “putting US-China relations on a very low scale,” referring to an assumption of negative intent. In contrast, the US believes hotlines are a way to be able to talk to each other quickly in case of misunderstanding or potential conflict. Borrowing the metaphor of a marriage, Barbara K. Bodine, a retired US ambassador and director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, explained, “if one side of a relationship thinks there is a misunderstanding or a problem, then any marriage counselor will tell you the other side needs to at least listen to why.”
China’s fear of the US’s crisis control measures putting the two countries’ relationship on what Shen described as a “a very low scale” has a certain degree of cultural relevance. However, many of these hotlines and crisis control measures have been established before between the US and China, and China has been keen to set up these mechanisms as well. As a matter of fact, the Art of War written by Sun Tze more than 2500 years ago discussed crisis management . Why are these not working for China anymore?
Xi: “the Taiwan Question is the Core of the Core Interests of China”
China’s lack of interest in military-to-military communication with the US at this time suggests China’s lack of concern that the US can threaten it militarily and shows China’s determination to solve the Taiwan issue following its own interest. The Taiwan issue refers to China’s claim that Taiwan is part of China and to its commitment to the principles of “peaceful reunification” and “one country, two systems” (hxxp://gm.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxw/202208/P020220810850182763063.pdf). US President Joe Biden has stated that the US would defend Taiwan if China invaded it; yet at the same time the official US position continues to adhere to the “one China” doctrine, refraining from recognizing Taiwan as an independent country.
The fact that China cut off military-to-military communication and several other channels of dialogue after US Representative Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taiwan shows the depth of their outrage at that visit.
The US and Chinese official readouts of Blinken’s June visit to China starkly differ. The US listed a wide range of issues Blinken discussed with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Director of the Chinese Communist Party Central Foreign Affairs office Wang Yi, and State Councilor and Foreign Minister Qin Gang. In contrast, Chinese official reports in the Chinese language on Blinken’s visit stressed only Blinken’s discussion of Taiwan (hxxp://www.news.cn/2023-06/22/c_1129711459.htm). The English-language Chinese government website gave two versions, one day apart, of what Blinken and the Chinese officials discussed. A report on June 20 listed five common understandings reached between the US and China, whereas a report issued June 21 emphasized “the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question” which “has always one of utmost importance in China-US relations.”
This emphasis on Taiwan echoed the tone of Chinese statements after a November 2022 meeting of Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden in Bali, Indonesia. After that meeting, Wang Yi briefed the Chinese and foreign media, stating that Xi “stressed that the Taiwan question is ‘the core of the core interests of China’, the bedrock of the political foundation of China-U.S. relations, and the red line that the United States must not and should not cross in China-U.S. relations.” “The core of core”, “bedrock”, and “red line” are the strongest possible words to emphasize Chinese thinking on the importance of the Taiwan question to the US-China relations. But this may be China’s one area of leverage against the US, which it could use to gain concessions in other areas. A Chinese government summary of the November 2022 meeting says Biden showed agreement to “four No’s and one no-intention” (四不一无意): no cold war against China, no changes to China’s system, no alliances against China, and no support for Taiwanese independence that could lead to a conflict with China, and no intention to have a conflict with China or to contain China. By the time of Blinken’s June visit, Chinese officials apparently concluded that the Biden administration had failed to live up to these promises.
China’s Growing Swagger
Tensions over Taiwan between China and the US have simmered for decades but were brought to a head by Pelosi’s visit, helping explain the single-minded focus on Taiwan in Chinese messaging since 2022. However, another factor also helps explain China’s lack of interest in military-to-military contacts. Chinese messaging appears designed to show it does not fear the prospect of facing possible military conflicts with the US over Taiwan. Chinese confidence likely builds from its growing military power, particularly the PLA Navy, which surpassed the US Navy in fleet size in 2020. Even though the PLA Navy’s technology may lag behind that of the US, “a bigger fleet almost always wins,” as a war expert from the US Naval War College warned.
So, China has enough reasons to ignore US’s talk requests, but it doesn’t mean it is not necessary to keep communication lines open from the US side for communication opportunities. Communication is key, particularly when the Taiwan question is at stake.